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The rapid increase in pharmaceutical expenditure in many countries has  generated much 
interest  in  the  pricing  of  pharmaceuticals.  Therefore  many  nations  have  some  form  of 
expenditure  regulation.  One  example  is  various  forms  of  price-cap  regulations,  and  many 
nations  worldwide  are  currently  applying  these  in  their  attempts  to  limit  the  cost  of 
pharmaceutical bills (Ess et al., 2003; Ioannides-Demos et al., 2002). 
However, this use of price-cap regulation is the subject of some controversy. Opponents 
argue that price regulation may adversely affect incentives to develop new and better products, 
since producers are not adequately reimbursed for the massive investments needed to bring new 
drugs to the market (Danzon and Chao, 2000a). 
The market for pharmaceuticals is for various reasons not fully comparable to traditional  
competitive markets in which other consumer products are sold, and in which the buyer is to a 
large extent able to ensure that he or she gets value for money. The inability of the individual to 
judge the merits of a drug, the fact that a patient’s views may be governed by optimism rather 
than strict logic and the manner in which that choice is in any case largely entrusted to a third 
party (the physician) distort the market. The fact that governments find themselves obliged to 
intervene  at  many  points  distorts  competitive  market  operation  still  further.  In  addition  to 
specific  safety  nets  intended  to  ensure  access  to  drugs,  countries  have  introduced  many 
consumer  protection  regulations  concerning  the  intrinsic  efficacy,  safety  and  quality  of 
pharmaceuticals,  as  well  as  measures  to  raise  the  standard  of  prescribing  and  promote  the 
appropriate use of drugs. 
In seeking to contain the costs of drug consumption, countries impose price controls, limit 
reimbursement  of  drugs,  de-list  drugs  considered  non-essential,  provide  non-commercial Liuc Papers n. 170, suppl. a maggio 2005 
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sources of information, and interfere with wholesale and retail margins, and may even restrict 
the manner in which medicines are prescribed and used (Jacobzone, 2000). 
The pharmaceutical market is characterised by the almost complete absence of consumers’ 
sovereignty; in this case, in fact, evaluation of the product cannot be related to a choice of the 
consumer or to a real cost-benefit evaluation of the products offered on the market. The health 
care literature has long recognised this problem and assumes that the consumer is ignorant about 
the true relationship between health care and recovered health (Zweifel and Breyer, 1997). For 
this reason, the demand is price inelastic. Because of the characteristics of the market for health 
care, the consumer seldom pays the full price of the drugs he uses. In a private market, it is the 
insurance company that pays for the drugs while the consumer pays an insurance premium. In a 
public health care system health care is usually financed through income tax and the consumer 
pays only a proportion of the price for the drug either in a lump sum form or as a percentage of 
the total cost. This creates fiscal illusion: when the consumer buys the product, the decision is 
made on the basis of perceived quality. In the end the total cost will have to be borne (increase 
in income tax/premium) but the link is not so straightforward. 
In  addition,  the  supply  side  of  the  pharmaceutical  market  is  characterised  by:  1)  high 
investment costs in R&D that are increasing (Berndt, 2002; DiMasi et al., 2003); 2) relatively 
low  marginal  costs  to  produce  the  drug  once  it  has  been  launched  on  the  market;  3)  high 
marketing costs (increasing) and a change in the marketing strategy: more and more consumer-
perceived, given the characteristics of the demand; 4) globalisation of the industry: most of the 
pharmaceutical companies are concentrated in the US and a few other countries; 5) asymmetry 
of information on the cost, especially R&D. It is very difficult to know the real amount of 
resources  invested  to  discover  a  new  drug  and  also  to  know  the  benefits  produced  by  its 
consumption in a specific population, therefore the regulatory authorities lack information for 
pricing new drugs.  
This industry can use resources to finance any project it likes even if not in the field where 
research is most needed. Good and bad projects are paid at the same rate. A new drug has to pay 
for all research, whether good or bad, and in most cases we do not even know the outcome. 
In  the  USA,  prescription  drug  prices  are  largely  unregulated.  In  most  other  countries, 
however, drug prices are regulated. ￿ational authorities have continued to implement a series of 
measures, both controls and incentives to influence supply of and demand for pharmaceuticals. 
All countries now recognise that both may be needed in order to control the growth rate of 
pharmaceutical expenditure. 
Methods  of  pharmaceutical  price  regulation  in  non-US  markets  are  heterogeneous  and 
include,  for  example,  direct  price  regulation  through  price  controls  (e.g.  France  and  Italy), S. Capri, R. Levaggi, Reconciling social and industrial goals: a bargaining model to pricing pharmaceuticals 
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indirect price regulation through limits on reimbursement under social insurance programmes 
(e.g. Germany and Japan) and indirect price regulation through profit controls (e.g. the United 
Kingdom)  (Danzon  and  Chao,  2000b).  Therefore,  for  example,  a  firm  with  75%  of  its 
pharmaceutical sales coming from non-US markets will be more exposed to price regulation 
than a firm with only half its pharmaceutical sales coming from non-US markets. While this 
proxy of price regulation is indeed imperfect, it should, nevertheless, shed some interesting light 
on the differences between US and non-US pharmaceutical price-cost margins. 
The pricing of drugs is a very important issue that the literature has largely investigated, 
even though a solution has not yet been identified. Despite a substantial empirical literature, the 
theoretical  literature  on  pharmaceutical  regulation  is  rather  scant,  apart  from  some  studies 
applied to the Australian system (Wright 2004). 
The issues at stake for determining the price of a drug are related to finding an “equitable” 
trade-off between the legitimate need for the industry to make a profit and full exploitation of 
the consumer’s surplus in a market with asymmetry of information. 
One  of  the  complicating  factors  in  this  particular  field  is  that  in  so  many  countries  a 
regulated,  collectively  financed  health  care  sector  coexists  with  a  free  and  profit-driven 
marketplace. Both are widely regarded as desirable and defensible, yet it is evident that where 
the two interact, conflicts may arise; a country seeking to contain pharmaceutical expenditure 
will  soon  find  itself  imposing  restraints  on  those  very  industrial  and  commercial  processes 
which it is so anxious to promote. 
The present model  is  an  attempt to take  into  account  the  interests of both  stakeholders, 
government  and  industry,  in  order  to  determine  a  fair  price  of  new  medicines,  through  a 
bargaining process rather than through a static model (Capri and Levaggi, 2002), based only on 
price differentials and incremental effectiveness.  
2. The model 
The model described in this paper is very general and can be used to set the price for new 
drugs, i.e. for active principles that have no therapeutical alternatives or for drugs that are only 
partially innovative, that is when a less effective alternative already exists on the market. We 
assume that the price is set through a bargaining process between the industry and a government 
agency. 
The aim of this process is twofold: on the one hand it makes the drug available to those who 
would not be able  to  afford its price  on  the  private market, and  on the  other  it allows  the 
pharmaceutical industry to make a bigger profit than it would obtain on the private market. Liuc Papers n. 170, suppl. a maggio 2005 
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The  method  used  in  this  paper  is  similar  to  Jelovac  (2002)  as  regards  definition  of  the 
objectives of the industry. In our approach, however, we consider a rather different objective 
function for Central Government and we assume that the drug is entirely financed by the public 
sector because the aim of this paper is to study pricing policies in a wider context than the one 
considered by Jelovac. 
The  bargaining  process  can  take  place  if  both  parties  have  an  advantage  from  the  no 
bargaining solution. The necessary condition for the industry to accept the regulation is increase 
of its profit from the reservation level represented by the alternative of selling the drug on the 
private market, while for Central Government the benefit of the drug must at least offset the 
costs, in terms of taxation, of subsidising its consumption. 
2.1. The industry’s objective function 
The industry wants to maximise its profit and in doing so it decides to accept the regulation 
only if the expected profit is at least equal to the one it would obtain by selling the product on 
the private market. Let’s start by assuming that the drug is new and there are no therapeutical 
alternatives. In this case the industry, once allowed to sell the product, has a patent, i.e. a right 
to sell the product as a monopolist for a fixed period of time. In this environment, the firm has 
to define the expected demand and its elasticity for applying standard monopoly pricing rules. 
In a market for goods, the demand would reflect the relative benefit of the product and each 
consumer would buy a specific quantity according to his preferences. 
In the market for pharmaceutical products, however, the setting is quite different. Health care 
is a primary need when demanded in order to recover from sickness, and we can assume that the 
consumer  will  buy  the  new  good  if  it  can  afford  its  cost.  For  this  reason  we  assume  that 
consumers’ behaviour is determined in the following setting. 
Each individual has a fixed probability p of being ill and if so he can benefit from the new 
drug. To simplify the model, we assume that one unit of the new drug is sufficient to treat the 
patient.  His income is then equal to Yi but it decreases to (1-d)Yi if ill; however the consumer 
can increase it by buying the new drug. His utility can then be written as:  
 
) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( N i N i i P Y E p Y p Y p - + - + - d              (1) 
 
where PN is the price of the drug. From (1) we can conclude that the patient will buy the 
drug if: 
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where  EN is the  effectiveness  of  the new  drug,  measured in  standard QALYs, Yi  is  the 
income of the ith individual and PN is the price of the new drug.  
This relationship can be interpreted as follows: the health gains will allow the consumer to 
increase his income so that he will be able to pay for the drug.  This assumption can be justified 
if we think along the lines of a long-term relationship and we interpret Y as a measure of 
permanent rather than current income. In the short run, it might be possible for the consumer to 
pay more than this amount by reducing his consumption and/or by using its saving, but in the 
long run this behaviour cannot be sustained.  Furthermore, for some consumers, there might not 
be a close relationship between earned income and health status
2
, but if we abstract from these 
considerations and look to long-run issues, this assumption is quite plausible. 
Given an income distribution and the probability of each consumer falling ill, the firm is able 
to derive a demand equation D(PN) whose shape depends on the income distribution and the 
type of illness (high/low incidence), but which will certainly be downward-sloping. 
The firm faces the following linear cost function: 
 
cD(PN)+F                    (2) 
 
where c is the marginal cost and F is the fixed cost of production. 
The firm sets PN in order to maximise its profit: 
 
) D(P )-F P-cD(P N N N P ] [ = P                 (3) 
 
Equation (3) can be solved to obtain the optimal price 
*
N P  and the reservation profit of the 
firm:  
 
F P D c P N N N P - - = Õ ) ( ) (
* *                 (4) 
 
This represents the minimum profit level the firm is prepared to accept from the regulator in 
that market, but it is not necessarily positive. 
The sign of 
*
N P Õ is very important from a policy point of view. A negative level means
3
 that 
the firm had foreseen from the start the intervention of the regulator in this market, i.e. the Liuc Papers n. 170, suppl. a maggio 2005 
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product has been developed under the implicit assumption that only through public intervention 
can it be made a viable (profit-making) therapeutical alternative. 
When  it is positive,  this  level represents  a  threshold  for  accepting  the regulation  by  the 
industry and can be used by the industry to accrue its negotiation power. 
2.2. The benefit for Central Government 
The intervention of a public regulator in the market is justified by equity reasons. The aim of 
the regulation is in fact to make available to the general public a drug that otherwise could be 
afforded only by a limited number of individuals with higher income. 
Through this process, however, important savings can be achieved also by those who would 
have bought the drug anyway. By making the drug available to the general public, the regulation 
considerably widens the market for the industry and in exchange for this a price reduction can 
be bargained for. 
Let’s start by defining the equivalent of the consumer surplus in this case. We assume that a 
population of N individuals benefits from the drug whose cost is financed through a linear 
income tax at rate t. As  before, each individual has a fixed probability p of being ill and if ill he 
can benefit from the new drug.  His income is equal to Yi but it decreases to dYi- if ill. 
His utility can then be written as: 
 
[ ] ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( )( 1 ( t Y E p t Y p i N i - + - + - - r             (5) 
 














and the total net benefit should be equal to: 
 
[ ] ￿ - + - + - - =
Y
Y
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This ideal process is however quite difficult to implement for several reasons: it requires a 
set of information on the distribution of income and tax revenue that is extremely difficult and 
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each country’s taxation system. The more the tax schedule is chosen optimally, the higher the 
benefit for the Central Government from the new drug, hence, other things being equal, the 
higher the price paid for the new drug. 
Furthermore, from the point of view of the public regulator, this formulation of the benefit to 
society might not be optimal since it is related to income and tends to put more weight/benefit 
on those illnesses that affect rich people. For this reason, we assume that the regulator takes 
account of the benefit for the average individual and its relative cost. 
A more plausible formulation for the benefit might be the following one: 
 
T Y pNE AB N - =                   (7) 
 
where pN is the number of individuals that are expected to benefit from the drug and T is the 
cost to society, in terms of taxation of the drug, i.e.  N pNP T =  
The net benefit can then be written as: 
 
) ( N N N P Y E pN AB - =                 (8) 
 
This function has a maximum for PN=0 and is equal to zero if  N N P Y E =  
The  industry  that  agrees  to  participate  in  the  regulation  process  will  be  faced  by  the 
following profit: 
 
F pN C PN N P - - = Õ ) (                 (9) 
 
which is increasing in PN and is equal to zero if 
pN
F
c PN + =  
In the previous section, however, we showed that in general the industry has a reservation 
profit equal to 
*
N P P  , which means that the minimum price it will accept is equal to 
*
N P . 
The curves for the benefits and the profit are shown in figure one. 












Figure one: The benefits from regulation 
 
The line B represents the average benefit for the drug and it is downward-sloping since the 
benefit decreases with an increase in price. The line P is the profit for the industry. It increases 
in price since the demand is predetermined in this case. 
*
N P  is the minimum price the industry 
will accept, and it might represent the cost of production of the new drug or the industry’s 
market  power.  The  bargaining  process  will  determine  a  price  in  the  interval 
) ; (
* Y E P N N according to the relative bargaining power of the two actors involved. 
3. The bargaining process 
The bargaining process determines the price that maximises the following function: 
 
b b )] 0 , max( arg ) [( )] ( [    Max     
* 1
N P N P N N N F pN c P P Y E pN Õ - - - -
-     (10) 
 
where b is the relative bargaining power of the industry and the regulator; we can define two 
polar cases:  for b=0 the regulator has all the power while if   b=1 the industry can set the price 
that maximises its profit. 
The bargaining power depends on several factors such as the importance of the drug in terms 
of the population that will benefit (p in our case), the severity of the disease that will be cured, S. Capri, R. Levaggi, Reconciling social and industrial goals: a bargaining model to pricing pharmaceuticals 
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the  number  of  alternatives  on  the  market  and  other  local  factors  such  as  the  ability  of  the 
regulator and the industry in the bargaining process. 
The first important thing to note is that a solution to the bargaining process can be found 
only if 
 
          Y E P P N N
*
N < <  
 
The first term represents the benefit while the second one represents the reservation price for 
the industry. The meaning of this expression is then clear: a bargaining solution can be found 
when the process is profitable for both parties. When this condition is not met, the drug will not 
be sold on the market unless the industry is prepared to make a loss. Given the cost structure of 
the pharmaceutical industry we can assume that the loss will depend on unrecovered fixed costs. 
From an economic point of view  Y EN  has a very important role since it might represent the 
willingness to pay for that new drug (World Bank 2002)
4
 . 
The pricing rule deriving from the following process is equal to: 
 
) ); ( ) max(( arg
) )( 1 ( ) (










- + + = b b
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The  formula  has  an  interesting  interpretation:  apart  from  b,  the  index  of  the  relative 
bargaining power of the two parties, the first term can be interpreted as joint indicator of cost 




 can be interpreted as a mark-up on costs that the industry can charge on its products. 
The other term is the public average benefit of the drug.  
The formula just presented is interesting since it shows that the knowledge of fixed costs, 
mainly determined by R&D investments, is not essential to the bargaining process, especially if 
the firm has a market without regulation. 
This formula can explain the differences in the price of the drug from country to country, 
especially  in  a  context  where  the  average  income  differs.  When  the  income  is  similar,  the 
differences derive from a different attitude of countries to the regulation and show the relative 
bargaining power of the public agency.  Liuc Papers n. 170, suppl. a maggio 2005 
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4. Extensions to the model 
In this section we consider how the model can be extended to determine the price of a new 
drug in settings where other competitors sell products that, although not bioequivalent, have a 
similar therapeutical value or can be used to treat the same condition. 
If there are other competitors on the market where the new drug is introduced, the process of 
regulation is fairly similar, but the reservation price of the industry is lower since it no longer 
has  a  monopoly  power  on  the  private  market.  There  are  two  cases  that  need  to  be  treated 
separately, namely: 
a)  there is an existing drug on the market that the regulator has decided not to reimburse; 
b)  the existing drug is fully reimbursed by the public regulator. 
In the first case, there are two issues that need to be addressed, the first being why the 
previous drug was not reimbursed since this might affect the policy for granting reimbursement. 
Whatever the reasons for non-inclusion of the previous drug, the application of a regulated price 
for the new one will have to take account of the competitor in defining the minimum profit 
level. 
In fact, the consumer will buy the new drug in the private market, if an alternative exists with 
effectiveness EO and price P if: 
 
O N O N i P P E E Y - > - ) (  
 
Using the same procedure as section 2, it is possible to determine the expected demand and 
the minimum profit. In this case the price will be equal to: 
 
] ), ( ) max[( arg '
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              (12) 
 
In this case, no general rule exists on whether the price in this market is lower or higher than 
for the other drug. However the cost-effectiveness of this new product has to be greater than for 
the previous alternative that was not included in the list.  
If, on the other hand, an alternative reimbursed drug exists, the firm has a limited demand 
since  only the richest  consumers will  buy the drug  and only  if  its effectiveness  more than 
outweighs the cost they have to bear: 
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As for the public health gains, the new drugs permit the following net increase: 
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and the price can be written as: 
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In this case, the industry has a much lower bargaining power, as one might expect. On the 
market there is in fact a valid alternative whose effectiveness has already been proved  and 
accepted by the regulator. The industry can charge a higher price that is strictly related to the 
differential in its effectiveness. This principle is becoming quite important in some public health 
care systems that adopt cluster reference pricing. 
5. The empirical relevance of the model: some applications  
In this session we discuss the empirical relevance of our model with references to some 
pricing policies that have been recently proposed to regulate the drug market. 
In particular, we will refer to the following ones: 
·  drug pricing for low income countries 
·  international reference pricing (Garcia Marinos et al., 2004) 
·  clustering reference price 
5.1. Low income countries 
In the recent past the problem of setting the price for drugs in low-income countries has been 
widely debated both from an economic and a political point of view (Scherer and Watal, 2002; 
Danzon and Towse, 2003). The most common solution is a substantial reduction in the average 
market  price  of  the  drug  that  the  industry  sells  to  low-income  countries  along  with  some 
measures to avoid parallel imports. Liuc Papers n. 170, suppl. a maggio 2005 
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This policy is usually seen as a liberal contribution of drugs companies towards low-income 
countries, but this might not be the case as our model clearly points out. 
For low-income countries, two factors contribute to a reduction in price: 
·  the mark-up is going to be limited since nobody would probably be able to afford to pay 
for the drug; 
·  the public benefit, in terms of accrued income from the increased QALY recovered via 
the drug, is fairly low due to a low average income. 
For a low-income country, setting a lower price does not necessarily mean that the industry 
has a low negotiation power; the decrease in price might depend on the ability of the country to 
pay. 
In this case, 
pN
A
 can even be set to zero since it might be reasonable to assume that the 
market is not fundamental for the industry which might decide to allocate its cost in R&D to the 
most  profitable  markets.  In  this  context,  in  fact,  the  marginal  cost  might  become  the  only 
relevant decision variable for the industry that charges the minimum possible price. 
It is interesting to note, however, that this might not necessarily mean that the industry is not 
able to exploit the ability to pay of the country considered. For a low-income country, a possible 











Figure two: Benefits for low-income countries 
 
In this case, the bargaining process would not have any reason to exist, since the price of 
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However, given the relatively low importance of this market for the industry and the extreme 
relevance of the drug for the country, the industry might agree to set
pN
F
  to zero and offer the 
drug for a price higher than c and as close as possible to  Y EN . 
A better measure of how much the industry contributes to the wellbeing of that specific low- 






N =  
 
PAD means “Price and Affordability of Drug”. 
The smaller the index, the more the industry is making a contribution towards the welfare of 
that nation. It is interesting to note that this index could be higher than one. In this case there 
would be exploitation of the market since the benefit would be lower than the cost. 
5.2. Reference pricing 
Reference-based  pricing  is  a  direct  cost-sharing  measure  whereby
  the  amount  of  money 
reimbursed for a drug is determined by the
 cost of the lowest priced "interchangeable agent" in 
that  therapeutic
  class  of  drugs;  any  cost  above  that  is  borne  by  the  patient  (Kanavos  and 
Reinhardt, 2003). 
Pharmaceutical companies remain free to charge more than the reference price; however, 
since the patient must pay the difference, demand is highly elastic above the reference price, 
leading most companies to drop their prices to the reference price. There is also a so-called 
international reference pricing, a policy by which the price of a drug in a predefined set of 
countries is set according to the average price in those countries. This policy is in line with the 
model  presented  in  this  paper  provided  that  the  income  has  a  low  cross-country  variation. 
Clustering reference price, on the other hand, refers to the policy of pricing at the average cost 
some drugs that are interchangeable. 
This policy can be explained by equation (13) of our model 
The implicit assumption is that a cluster of drugs has the same effectiveness (EN) and the 
same marginal cost. If this is the case, their regulated price has to be the same. 
It is however important to note that, in the logic of our model, this pricing rule is fully 
justified only in two specific cases: Liuc Papers n. 170, suppl. a maggio 2005 
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a)  the willingness to pay in the private market would lead both products to have the same 
profit level; 
b)  the minimum price accepted by the industry is equal to  c
pN
F
+  and both drugs have the 
same cost; 
c)  the industry has a full monopoly power and sets the price equal to the net average benefit 
of the drug. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we present a simple bargaining process to set the price of drugs in the context 
of a public health care system. 
The  model  presented  in  this  article  uses  an  approach  to  explain  the  bargaining  process 
between the industry and the public regulator. The need for regulation arises for several reasons:  
·  it might be required to subsidise the industry because the cost of R&D is so high that the 
private demand on the private market would not be sufficient to break even; 
·  it might be inspired by equity reasons. In this case, the regulator enters the market to 
grant a substantial reduction in the cost of the drug and to make it available to those who 
would  not  be  able  to  afford  its  cost.  The  regulation  process  is  viable  because  the 
production volume increases and, given the nature of drug costs, this permits an increase 
in profits. 
The benefits of this process are shared between the regulator and the industry according to 
the market power of the two actors. 
In particular, we  note  that  if  an alternative  exists  on  the market, i.e. a comparator  with 
similar or equivalent efficacy, the new drug has to be more cost-effective to enter, and in any 
case its cost- effectiveness represents the upper limit to its price. 
Our model explains several features of the drug regulation process. It shows how the policy 
of selling drugs to lower-income countries at very low prices can still be interpreted within a 
bargaining model and such a low price does not necessarily mean that the industry has no power 
in the regulation process. In this light the rationale of policies such as reference pricing and 
clustering also emerges. 
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and what the individual would have earned if he was able to work throughout the whole period. 
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 If we exclude the case in which the firm has made a mistake in planning. 
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